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The links between migration and development, including the specific role of 
migrants’ remittances, have been extensively studied in the last few years (Nyberg-
Sørensen et al., 2002; Ratha, 2003 and 2004; GCIM, 2005; Haas, 2005; OECD, 2005 
and 2006; Ghosh, 2006; World Bank, 2006a and 2006b, among others). The priority 
given to this issue is easily understandable. On the one hand, international migration 
flows have been on the rise during recent decades, facing an increasing number of 
obstacles, including a generally restrictive stance of host countries’ immigration 
policies, but overcoming them all, even at the price of immigrants’ rights. On the 
other hand, international differences on economic development levels are still among 
the main explanatory factors of migration. Migration flows often result from a lack of 
development perspectives in the sending countries, reinforcing the economic potential 
of host ones. However, a number of retroactive effects emerge: the growth of 
migration is often accompanied by abundant economic transfers back home, including 
remittances, investments and benefits from international trade, besides information 
and human capital. In sum, from the point of view of sending countries, migration and 
development may reinforce each other, being this crucial for the increase of well-
being and the decrease of migration potential. 
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In this paper, the specific role of remittances in the migration-development nexus will 
be examined. It will be argued that migrants’ remittances exert mixed impacts 
(positive, negative and neutral) over the economic development of sending countries, 
and that institutions play a crucial role in maximizing the positive and minimizing the 
negative ones. The main geographical area taken into consideration is Europe, one of 
the most important world regions in the volume of international migration, and 
particularly Central and Eastern Europe, a crossroad for many inward and outward 
flows, and also a fast-growing beneficiary of immigrants’ remittances.  
 
In the first section, some trends of current international migration in Europe will be 
highlighted, including flows involving Central and Eastern Europe, as well as some 
causal factors and prospects for continuing migration in the future. In the second 
section, remittances will be observed as one of the main consequences of international 
migration, and an evaluation of its volume in Central and Eastern European (and 
Central Asian) economies will be done. In the third section, impacts of remittances 
over development will be stressed, revealing its mixed effects (positive, negative and 
neutral). Finally, the specific role of economic, social and political institutions will be 
discussed, arguing that they exert a vital role in determining which outcomes will 
predominate. 
 
Immigration in Europe 
 
The problems of measuring and comparing international migration trends are well 
known. International statistics are incomplete and display a wide methodological 
variety, leading to the difficulty of building a rigorous knowledge on the subject. On 
the conceptual side, some of the main differences result from the universe that is taken 
into consideration or, in other terms, who must be named an “immigrant”. One of the 
main cleavages separates statistics based on country of birth (foreign born individuals) 
and on citizenship (foreign citizens). The first are maybe the most rigorous to capture 
“immigration”, but the second reflect the major social and political concerns on the 
field. A second conceptual cleavage refers to the length of stay of immigrants in the 
host country, and for this no unanimous position exists.  
 
Another type of methodological difficulty results from the source under consideration. 
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Even within the same country and when a similar concept is adopted, the use of 
administrative registers, census and surveys often leads to very different numbers. The 
endemic presence of irregular immigrants, resulting from a complex array of factors 
(migration pressure, restrictive policies, high labour demand and informal economy), 
also reinforces the shortcomings of data. In sum, problems of evaluation and 
comparability are widespread. The difficulties in measuring immigrants occur even in 
integrated spaces, such as the European Union (EU), both for intra-EU and third-
country migrants (Poulain et al., 2006). 
 
Despite methodological difficulties, the high volume and rising trend of immigration 
in Europe is an acknowledged fact. Either taking into consideration statistics based on 
foreign-born individuals, or statistics based on foreign citizens, several European 
countries rank today among the main immigrant receiver countries in the world, ahead 
or next to the traditional countries of immigration (USA, Canada and Australia).  
 
Taking the foreign-born population living in OECD countries in 2005 (Table 1), 
several European countries, from North to South, most from the EU, register 10 or 
more per cent of the total population under this condition: Luxembourg, Switzerland, 
Austria, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands and Greece. Besides the 
specific case of Luxembourg (a small country counting with numerous intra-EU 
exchanges), the highest value is the one of Switzerland, with 24 per cent, superior to 
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 in selected OECD countries,
2005 or latest available year
 
 
Strong immigration is also captured by statistics based on foreign citizenship. Taking 
the foreign population living in OECD countries in 2005 (Table 2), many European 
countries count with more than 5 per cent of foreign citizens in their total population. 
Again, Northern, Western and Southern European countries, most from the EU, are 
grouped in the top (the ranking is partly equivalent to the former): Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Spain, France, Sweden, Greece, 
United Kingdom and Denmark. The varied European targets reveal both the strength 
of traditional immigration waves, mainly started after the Second World War, and 












France (1999) 3263,2 5,6
Sweden 479,9 5,3
Greece 553,1 5,2








Stock of foreign population
 in selected OECD countries,
2005 or latest available year
 
 
Taken in this context, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe occupy a mixed 
position. The number of foreign-born and foreign citizens in this region is also rising; 
however, a significant out-migration still exists, either respecting to country nationals 
or transit migration. The destinations of Central and Eastern European emigrants are, 
in a large extent, situated in the rest of Europe. Taking the number of Central and 
Eastern European nationals living in OECD European states in 2005 (Table 3), several 
migration routes are visible, differing according to the source country. The major 
destinations for Romanians are some of the newest immigrant receiving countries in 
Europe, namely Italy and Spain, as well as Hungary; for Polish, the major destinations 
are Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy; for Ukrainians, are Germany, Italy, 




(thousands) Romania Poland Ukraine Russian F. Total %
Belgium 900,5 7,5 18,0 ... ... 25,5 2,8
Czech Republic 278,3 2,7 17,8 87,8 16,3 124,6 44,8
Denmark 270,1 ... 7,4 ... ... 7,4 2,7
Finland 113,9 ... ... ... 24,6 24,6 21,6
France (1999) 3263,2 ... 33,8 ... ... 33,8 1,0
Germany 6755,8 ... 326,6 130,7 185,9 643,2 9,5
Greece 553,1 18,9 16,1 12,2 17,6 64,8 11,7
Hungary 154,4 66,2 2,4 15,3 2,8 86,7 56,2
Ireland (2002) 219,3 4,9 ... ... 2,6 7,5 3,4
Italy 2670,5 297,6 60,8 107,1 ... 465,5 17,4
Netherlands 691,4 ... 15,2 ... ... 15,2 2,2
Norway 222,3 ... 6,8 ... ... 6,8 3,1
Poland (2002) 49,2 ... ... 9,9 4,3 14,2 28,9
Portugal 432,0 11,1 ... 44,9 ... 56,0 13,0
Slovak Republic 25,6 ... 2,8 3,7 ... 6,5 25,4
Spain 2738,9 192,1 ... ... ... 192,1 7,0
Sweden 479,9 ... 17,2 ... ... 17,2 3,6
United Kingdom 3035,0 ... 110,0 ... ... 110,0 3,6
Source: OECD, 2007
Stock of foreign population in selected OECD European countries,
2005 or latest available year




The role played by Central and Eastern European immigrants in more developed 
European countries has been increasing in recent years. Despite the shortcomings of 
data, the observation of annual inflows in 2000 and 2005 (Table 4) reveals that they 
are major source countries. In 2000 the two most important senders to European 
OECD countries were Morocco and Ecuador, with flows of almost 100 thousand 
individuals each, being followed by Poland and Bulgaria, with between 81 and 94 
thousand. In 2005 Poland and Romania are on the top, with flows surpassing the 300 
and 200 thousand, respectively, being joined by Bulgaria, Ukraine and the Russian 






Morocco 96 Poland 324
Ecuador 95 Romania 202
Poland 94 Morocco 128
Bulgaria 81 Bulgaria 82
Turkey 79 Germany 77
Romania 76 Ukraine 70
United States 64 Turkey 66
Germany 61 United Kingdom 65
France 60 Russian Federation 54
Italy 56 France 49
Source: OECD, 2007
Main sources for immigration in OECD European countries -





The causes of international migration and, particularly, of Central and Eastern 
European migration to other European destinations are multiple. As shown by a large 
body of research, the causes for immigration vary from context to context. They 
encompass economic push and pull factors (levels of wages and employment); the 
segmentation of labour markets; the flexibilisation of employment; the diffusion of 
the informal economy; demographic factors; international trade and foreign 
investment (causing direct intra-organisational mobility and indirect effects); informal 
social networks; smuggling and trafficking networks; and active migration systems 
(see Massey et al., 1998). In the Central and Eastern European geographical context, 
the chronology of migration is decisive: since the late 1980s, the strength of some 
general factors has mixed with specific ones resulting from the transition of post-
socialist economies, the whole being reinforced by globalization. The moment in 
which migration has started explains why new types of migration and new 
destinations countries (including the Southern European ones) prevailed, compared to 
inflows occurred during the period of mass migration after the Second World War. 
 
It can be argued that structural causes for immigration, particularly economic 
immigration, exist in the present and will be maintained in the foreseeable future. 
They result from the maintenance of push factors in sending countries and the 
decisive role of demand in host ones or, in other terms, the economic and social 
reasons leading to a structural need of immigrants in the labour force. Skill shortages 
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and the filling up of labour niches left vacant by natives, aggravated by ageing and 
demographic decline, stand among the main reasons that will continue to propel 
immigration. These factors will probably more than compensate the role of others that 
tend to substitute or avoid immigration. The latter include technological 
improvements, policies designed to increase the participation rates of the resident 
population (particularly of women), an (unlikely) demographic revival and the social 
and political unease of European societies dealing with immigration.  
 
The role occupied by Central and Eastern European countries in future European 
migration flows is complex. While many will register a migration turnaround similar 
to what occurred in other European locations, most recently Southern Europe, others 
will probably maintain significant outward flows. 
 




The consequences of migration are multiple: they include impacts at the host and 
sending countries, occurring at the economic, social, cultural and political level. No 
general theory exists to capture these impacts; the immensity of them all requires 
contextual and discrete observations. At the economic level, no systematic evidence 
has also been found about overall consequences. For receiving countries, 
consequences are mostly viewed as positive: they include economic growth and 
innovation; however, effects on employment and wage levels have been subject to 
discussion, since they are varied and affect differently natives, long-term immigrants 
and recent immigrants. Outcomes also depend on immigrants’ characteristics. For 
sending countries, economic impacts are mixed and complex. Among other variables, 
they include financial flows, such as migrants’ remittances. Their consequences at the 
micro and macro level have justified a vast research in recent years. 
 
When trying to study remittances the first problem to deal with is the definition of the 
term. A lack of definition or the use of non-comparable datasets can harm 
comparisons made between different countries. Most of the bibliography used in this 
paper convened in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) definition which record 
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remittances in three different sections of the balance of payments: compensations of 
employees, workers remittances and migrants’ transfers. Compensations of employees 
are the earnings of workers that stay abroad less than 12 months, while workers 
remittances are the earnings of workers that stay abroad more than 12 months. 
Migrants’ transfers are “the net wealth of migrants who move from one country of 
employment to another” (OECD, 2006: 140).  
 
This definition problem is deepened due to several aspects:  
• there is no consensus on the definition of the term and, due to that, there is no 
worldwide implementation. As a consequence, statistical data often differs;  
• the recognised formal channels differs from country to country;  
• the remittances transferred through informal channels are substantial and not 
recorded;  
• sometimes remittances are misclassified.  
 
Therefore it is generally accepted that is very difficult to accomplish accurate figures 
on international remittances. This difficulty is evident when a detailed national 
observation is carried out: when consulting datasets from country to country we find 
that remittances are often non-comparable or misclassified.  
 
Despite these shortcomings, available data reveal that remittances have been 
increasing in the last years, reaching USD 232 billion in 2005 (World Bank, 2006a). 
This has been occurring consistently, even when there is a decrease in Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and in capital market flows. Due to this reality, remittances are 
attracting more attention each day, because they may assume a crucial role in 
development processes. This is also the reason why it has been recognized that it is 
important to develop remittances related policies, in order to increase their benefits 
and decrease their negative impacts.  
 
The observation of worldwide figures confirms the fast pace of growth and high 
volume of migrants’ remittances (Table 5). Taken as the sum of compensations of 
employees, workers remittances and migrants’ transfers, the World Bank estimates 
that the volume of remittances increased from USD 69 to 232 billions between 1990 
and 2005. From this number, USD 167 billion went to developing countries in 2005, 
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up from USD 31 billion in 1990. The growth rate has been the highest in 2000-2005, 
confirming the strength and, often, counter-cyclical nature of these flows. However, 
the improvement of statistics may be also responsible for the recent growth, given the 
better recording systems that are rapidly being set. 
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 % 
1990-95 1995- 2000-
To developing countries 31,2 57,8 85,6 166,9 85,3 48,1 95,0
     from which:
     Europe and Central Asia 3,2 8,1 13,4 19,9 153,1 65,4 48,5
World 68,6 101,6 131,5 232,3 48,1 29,4 76,7
Source:  World Bank, 2006a
Table 5
Worker's remittances, 1990-2005 (USD billions)
 
 
These figures are certainly under-estimated. The reality faced by most immigrants, 
including high transfer costs, undeveloped financial systems and traditional habits, 
make them remit large funds through informal channels. Due to this fact, the World 
Bank estimates that real remittances can amount to 50 per cent more than the 
officially recorded ones (World Bank, 2006a: 85). The exact situation of the informal 
transfers is hard to evaluate, because they can be extremely volatile, due to various 
economic and political factors. These numbers suggest that it is important to 
understand why people remit money through informal channels, and not through 
formal ones. An often announced objective of international institutions is to diminish 
the proportion of informal transfers, given its higher risks and frequent lesser benefits 
for stakeholders.  
 
Remittances have been assuming a very important role in international financial flows 
throughout the years. When compared to other financial flows, they currently occupy 
the second place, after FDI and before official development assistance (ODA). In 
2005, the volume of remittances represented more than twice the level of international 
development aid. In many countries, including some of Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA), remittances are already in the first place, ahead of FDI.  
 
This surge in remittances brought about the necessity of understanding the trends and 
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impacts of such flows. In recent years, the academic literature has been maybe 
surpassed by documents produced in the framework of international financial 
institutions. Entities such as the IMF, the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank and OECD have produced numerous studies on the issue. In 2004 
the G-8 also initiated a global effort to improve remittance statistics; as a 
consequence, in 2005 the World Bank and the IMF held a conference in order to agree 
which data and compliers to use, when collecting remittances data. In 2007, the 
European Commission also conducted a survey in order to collect reliable data from 
the member states, because the EU is one of the most important remittance receiving 
and sender regions (Eurostat, 2007). 
 
Remittances to Central and Eastern Europe 
 
In Central and Eastern European countries, particularly in those where emigration and 
remittances are significant, the trends referred above are also a reality. Most of the 
available data is published by the World Bank, what explains that a larger 
geographical entity – Europe and Central Asia (ECA) – will be used in the next 
paragraphs. As may be seen above (Table 5), the officially recorded remittances to 
ECA was almost USD 20 billion in 2005, representing 11.9 per cent of remittances 
received by developing countries and 8.6 per cent of the global total.  
 
For many ECA countries, remittances were the second most important source of 
external financing after FDI but, for the poorest ones, they are the largest one. It is 
known that remittances helped individuals and families to cope with economic and 
political instability after transition. The volume of emigration and, correspondingly, of 
migrants’ remittances have also been consistent during the years, even after transition. 
Therefore it is of extreme importance to analyse remittance data and to understand the 
impacts of such flows, both in national economies and in households.  
 
Remittance flows to the ECA region differ from country to country. According to the 
World Bank (2007) (see Table 6), the EU is the main source of remittances, 
representing three-quarters of the total. It is followed by Russia and resource-rich 
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with circa 10 per cent of 
the total. The main beneficiaries, in absolute volume of remittances, are the new and 
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accession EU countries, followed by the Balkans. While both groups receive the bulk 
of remittances from the EU 15, other ECA countries display a more heterogeneous 
condition. For example, Ukraine and Moldova receive around half of remittances 
from EU 15, and circa 37 per cent from Russia and resource-rich CIS. This shows that 
countries in the region are engaged in different migration systems: while some are 
mainly linked to the EU, others are involved in intra-CIS movements. 
 
Receiving New and Balkans Russia and Moldova Non Total
acession resource- and resource
Sending EU rich CIS  Ukraine -rich CIS
Number (USD millions)
EU 15 2813 1322 357 223 428 5143
New and acession EU 244 168 85 23 35 555
Balkans 1 0,1 1 0,2 0,4 2
Russia and resource-rich CIS 46 2 183 165 340 736
Moldova and Ukraine 18 0,3 200 29 8 255
Non resource-rich CIS 36 2 61 3 54 156
Total 3159 1495 886 443 865 6848
Percentage
EU 15 89,0 88,4 40,3 50,3 49,5 75,1
New and acession EU 7,7 11,2 9,6 5,2 4,0 8,1
Balkans 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
Russia and resource-rich CIS 1,5 0,1 20,7 37,2 39,3 10,7
Moldova and Ukraine 0,6 0,0 22,6 6,5 0,9 3,7
Non resource-rich CIS 1,1 0,1 6,9 0,7 6,2 2,3
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: World Bank, 2007
Remittances flows in Europe and Central Asia by subregion, 2003
Table 6
 
The economic importance of remittances also varies deeply. When compared to the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), some of the countries in the world where remittances 
amount to a larger fraction of GDP (15 to 30 per cent) in 2004 are in ECA: Moldova, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania. In the case of Moldova, remittances represent 
almost one-quarter of the national income (on the Moldovan case, see Mosneaga, 
2007). However, in most of the ECA countries remittances represented less than 5 per 
cent of GDP in 2004 (World Bank, 2007).  
 
When compared to exports, we find out that for some countries remittances represent 
a large fraction of exports. This is the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with almost 55 
per cent, Albania, with a little more than 40 per cent, and Moldova, with almost 35 
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per cent. Confirming the heterogeneity of ECA regarding the economic importance of 
remittances, in approximately half of ECA countries remittances represented less than 
5 per cent of exports in 2004 (World Bank, 2007). 
 
Taking into account that exports are one of the major sources of foreign exchange in a 
country, remittances represent a key complementary source of foreign exchange for 
the countries in the region. This way they provide the hard currency needed for 
importing scarce inputs that are not available domestically and also additional savings 
for economic development. In the case of Albania, remittances financed more than 70 
per cent of the deficit since 1995 (World Bank, 2007: 62).  
 
As a significant source of foreign exchange, remittances may improve decisively 
creditworthiness and access to international capital markets in several ECA countries. 
When considering remittances, the level of indebtedness displayed by the ratio of 
external debt to exports may decline significantly. For example, in the case of Albania 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, when considering remittances as an alternative source 
of foreign exchange, the ratio of debt to exports fall by close to 50 per cent (id., ibid.: 
62).  
 
The heterogeneity of this region is vast. In the new EU member states, particularly in 
the ones that adhered in 2004, the situation is quite different from many others. The 
development realities of such countries, including trends in foreign investment, make 
it less interesting to migrate. Also, as the income levels are higher, there is not such 
need for migrants living abroad to finance their families back home. Therefore, 
remittance levels are smaller. However, the possibility of free circulation has enacted 
in some a surge in outflows, and a corresponding increase in remittances.  
 
Remittances and development 
 
Impacts of remittances on development 
 
Despite the difficulties in statistical measurement, the concept of remittances is 
simple: remittances are basically private money sent by emigrants to their families 
and contacts back home, targeted for consumption, debt payment, savings or 
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investment. The problem is to translate this reality into national and international 
statistics. As referred to above, difficulties in having a good measurement are 
deepened by the existence of formal and informal channels for remittances transfers. 
Even when good official statistics are available, problems of data quality result from 
the amounts sent outside the formal financial sector. In recent years we have assisted 
to an increase in remittances flows, but this increase can mean a real increase in the 
amounts transferred, a higher fraction of formal transfers and improvements in the 
statistical and measurement methods. 
 
The impacts of remittances on development are multiple. Generally speaking, several 
positive impacts have been pointed out. First of all, remittances are an important 
financial asset, both from the micro (individuals and families) and macro (country) 
perspective. The fact that their volume is often larger than ODA and occasionally than 
FDI shows us how important they are for development.  
 
Second, they present a non-cyclical or counter-cyclical character. This makes possible 
to home countries to have stable financial inflows, even in downturn moments due to 
financial crisis, natural disasters or political conflicts. Moreover, repeated evidence 
shows that flows tend to increase in times of economic hardship, especially when they 
are the main sources of family income. 
 
Third, taking a closer perspective, they represent direct benefits for families. They 
have a direct impact on poverty reduction, are often invested in health and education – 
thus contributing to the increase of human capital –, and maybe translated into 
households savings and investments. According to the World Bank (2006a: 117), 
remittances can “reduce poverty, even where they appear to have little impact on 
measured inequality; help smooth household consumption by responding positively to 
adverse shocks (for example, crop failure, job loss, or a health crisis); ease working 
capital constraints on farms and small-scale entrepreneurs; and lead to increased 
household expenditures in areas considered to be important for development, 
particularly education, entrepreneurship, and health”.  
 
The direct benefits for families are larger due to the non-cyclical or counter-cyclical 
character of remittances. In downturn moments they help on basic needs and poverty 
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reduction, and in expansionary ones they are often invested in health and education 
(increase of human capital), besides savings and investment.  
 
In this respect, using a large data set for 74 countries, Adams and Page (2003) found 
that remittances have a strong impact on reducing poverty, controlling for income and 
inequality. For example, a 10% increase in the share of international migrants in the 
population or in the share of remittances received in GDP reduces the fraction of 
people living on less than one dollar per day by 1.9 and 1.6%, respectively (see also 
Page and Plaza, 2005).  
 
A fourth positive impact of remittances is the multiplier effect, even when mostly 
targeted to consumption (Ratha, 2003). When one dollar is spent, it starts a cycle of 
retail sales, which originate further demand for goods and services, stimulating output 
and employment. Besides, fiscal gains take place, since additional consumption leads 
to an increase of indirect tax receipts, thus also increasing government consumption 
and funds (World Bank, 2007: 66). At the same time, remittances have spillover 
effects on non-migrant families.  
 
Fifth, when looking to remittances as a source of foreign exchange, they can improve 
a country’s creditworthiness and thereby enhance its access to international capital 
markets. Furthermore, remittances can help in the access to international capital 
markets through the use of structured finance techniques. This way, countries in need 
can have access to relatively cheap and long-term financing, via securitization of 
future remittance flows.  
 
Sixth, remittances have positive impacts for the financial system when formal 
channels are used. The increase in the proportion of remittances transferred through 
formal channels may be beneficial for migrants but, also, for financial institutions. 
The former diminish risks and profit from financial benefits, providing than 
transaction costs are low and financial products are well structured. The latter benefit 
from the increase of funds and clients, and are able to create mutually advantageous 
products and enjoy higher profits. 
 
Besides the positive effects, also neutral and negative impacts of remittances on 
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development can be found. First, as already stated, the fact that remittances are a 
private flow, mainly contributing to basic needs and household consumption, may 
exert neutral or negative impacts. Its non-productive character when targeted to 
consumption may be aggravated when linked to the purchase of imported goods and 
services. Furthermore, even when driven to investment, they may only be directed for 
self-subsistence, housing or small services. In other words, when channelled to 
consumption or to low productive investments, their impact at the macroeconomic 
level is weak. Only when invested in broader projects and programmes, eventually in 
cooperation with local, regional and national organisations, they can be managed to 
more effective uses, with a global impact in the receiving countries.  
 
Second, remittances help to increase the revenue of the migrant sending families, but 
may contribute to the enlargement of social inequality. In fact, there is frequent 
evidence that migrants come from wealthier families, because these families have 
more possibilities to finance the migratory process and have better access to 
information. In other words, emigrants do not come often from the poorest of the 
poor, mainly in the context of long-distance movements, and remittances do not 
always benefit the less privileged groups. 
 
Third, remittances may sometime induce a decrease in the private production effort, 
stimulating a rentist behaviour and reducing the family work effort. This effect, 
known as the moral hazard problem, may contribute to the decrease of economic 
output. 
 
Fourth, when regarding multiplier effects, effects can be at a lower scale when the 
infrastructure is weak. When the economy is not prepared, or does not have the 
conditions to catalyze some of the productive effects of remittances, their impact can 
be smaller. 
 
Fifth, the sustained growth of remittances can generate upward pressures on the real 
exchange rate and contribute to the reduction of the competitiveness of exports. 
However, authors such as Rajan and Subramanian (2005) did not find substantial 
evidence that remittances reduce competitiveness and slow down growth. In the same 
vein, arguments about a Dutch Disease effect seem less relevant in the case of 
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remittances, compared to the case of natural resources, given their stability over time. 
The IMF also admits that adequate policies may sustain the real exchange rate level 
(World Bank, 2006a: 104).  
 
Sixth, remittances may exert inflationary pressures, when directed to non-tradable 
goods. The most exemplary case is the one of land. Remittances are often used to the 
purchase of land, for patrimonial or economic reasons, thus leading to inflationary 
trends. 
 
Finally, as an important part of remittances stays outside the formal sector, they may 
have no significant effects on the financial sector. 
 
Remittances and development in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Sparse evidence for ECA countries points towards the impacts of remittances on 
development. Regardless of national variations, the numbers involved are important, 
because remittances they can be saved, invested or spent in household consumption. 
Each of these uses has distinct consequences. The impacts of saving and investment 
can be better seen at the macro level, while the impacts of consumption are visible at 
the micro level, but all involve multiplier effects in the economy. 
 
According to the World Bank, surveys in six ECA countries (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Romania and Tajikistan) found 
that almost 30 per cent of remittances are spent in consumption of food and clothing, 
almost 15 per cent in education and circa 10 per cent are used for savings. From the 
largest recipients of remittances as a portion of GDP (Moldova, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Albania), Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina spent more than 25 
per cent of remittances funding household consumption (World Bank, 2007: 64-65). 
 
As regards macro-economic trends, remittances may have exerted “a mild positive 
impact on long-term patterns of macroeconomic growth” (World Bank, 2007: 61). As 
already seen, remittances can contribute to economic growth either when invested or 
targeted for consumption. The increase in migrants’ household income generates 
positive multiplier effects (Ratha, 2003) and its use in education is an investment in 
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human capital. An analysis of 11 transition economies of Eastern Europe during 1990-
99 carried out by León-Ledesma and Piracha (2001) suggested that remittances had a 
positive impact on productivity and employment, through their direct and indirect 
effects on investment. 
 
As regards the impacts of remittances on poverty reduction and income inequality the 
results are not so clear. Remittances seem to exert a positive impact on poverty 
reduction but a mixed impact on income inequality. Studies in another contexts have 
shown that an increase in the share of international migrants in a country’s population 
leads to a decline in the share of people living on less than a 1 USD per person per 
day (Adams and Page, 2003), but when analysing income inequality the evidence is 
mixed (Ratha, 2003). 
 
A study conducted in five ECA countries (Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajikistan) found out that richer households receive more remittances as 
a proportion of all households, and that this tendency is prevalent for all countries in 
the study. This situation is a consequence of the abilities that richer families have to 
send family members abroad. Such families have better access to information, to the 
necessary capital for the migration process, and to social relationships that help the 
migration process. At the same time the majority of sending families live in urban 
areas, and therefore urban areas are the major remittances recipients (except for 
Albania and Tajikistan). This is because international migration may be more difficult 
when living in rural areas, and because some remittances receiving households might 
migrate into cities (World Bank, 2007: 70-71).  
 
The role of institutions 
 
A decisive point, from the point of view of emigrant sending countries, is that there is 
no direct or linear relationship between migration and development, or between 
remittances and development. Most outcomes depend on contextual variables, such as 
public policies, the private business framework and agents’ behaviour. This explains 
why contradictory evidence is found when impacts are examined. The role of 
institutions, both public and private, and of individual agents, has been accepted in 
many studies, but is often dealt with in an insufficient way. For example, the World 
 20
Bank describes its difficulties as follows: “Part of the explanation for these distinct 
findings maybe that the studies suffer from an omitted variable bias: the role of 
institutions. We hypothesize that the impact of remittances on macroeconomic growth 
and development is conditioned by the quality of the recipient country’s political and 
economic policies and institutions. The quality of institutions might play an important 
role in determining the exact effect of remittances on economic growth, because 
institutions exert substantial influence on the volume and efficiency of investment” 
(World Bank, 2007: 67). 
 
It may be argued that a priority in current research about remittances and their impacts 
on development is the observation of variables that can be moulded by institutional 
action and the improvement of institutional programs designed to maximize their 
economic benefits. In this framework, several types of institutions may be considered, 
including the national, regional and local government, public and private firms 
(including banks and other financial agencies), immigrants associations and other 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
 
A first general objective of institutional action is to increase the use of formal 
channels for remittances. Either through money transfer operators (MTOs) or 
commercial banks, this will lead to a better control and use of remittances. Even being 
private capital, when transferred through formal channels a number of benefits arise. 
These include a better measurement and better study of how they can promote 
development and economic growth; a more effective channelling, as finance capital, 
to investors and to national projects; and the possibility for private remitters to 
diminish the risks and diversifying their benefits, whenever good financial products 
are provided. 
 
A second objective is to integrate remittances in a well consolidated financial system. 
The benefits for migrants, migrants’ families and non-migrants will be larger when 
remittances are channelled and deposited in national, regional and local banks or 
related financial institutions. For example, the creation of special savings accounts 
will attract remittances and improve the benefits for migrants. Improved access to 




Transferring remittances through formal channels helps to develop the financial 
system and also to decrease the costs of transfers. If financial institutions find out that 
this is a good source of revenues, they will invest and promote such channels, 
promoting competition and easing the access to more people. 
 
A third objective is to maximize the collective benefits of remittances or, in the same 
vein, to enlarge their direct beneficiaries. This can be done by channelling remittances 
through migrants’ associations, aiming at investments in infrastructures in sending 
regions (collective investments); or by creating partnerships between migrants’ 
associations, governments and local authorities (municipalities) from host and sending 
countries. 
 
The role of municipalities, home town associations and other NGOs is relevant when 
developing projects with migrant communities. The wider known examples come 
from Mexico. One is the “Padrino Program”, which is directed to Mexican-American 
business people who, in consultation with local communities, choose to invest in one 
or more of over 1000 projects. There are also matching grants, and the best known is 
Mexico’s 3-for-1 program, under which the local, state and federal governments all 
contribute 1 USD for every 1 USD of remittances sent to a community for a 
designated development project. It is arguable if these matching and incentive 
programs canalize the money to the highest priority projects; however, they do satisfy 
some community needs. 
 
It may be argued that the fulfilment of these general objectives is faced with several 
obstacles, either from the point of view of migrants’ host or sending country. From 
the point of view of the immigrants’ host country, the main problems are: cost of 
remittances and access to services.  
 
Remittance fee pricing is complex and often insufficiently explained to remitters. The 
price of a remittance transaction includes a currency-conversion fee, for delivery of 
local currency to the beneficiary in another country, and a fee charged by the sending 
agent. Therefore, fees can be as high as 20 per cent of the remittance amount. It 
depends on the channel, corridor and transaction type (World Bank, 2006a: 136-137).  
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The remittance cost tends to be high, mainly when the amount remitted is lower. 
However, in recent years, remittance fees have declined. This resulted from several 
factors, mostly felt in high-volume corridors (such as the USA-Mexico one): the 
intensification of competition between major MTOs (such as Western Union and 
MoneyGram); the attraction of new migrant clients, by some banks in host countries, 
with minimal transfer fees; technological improvements, resulting from easier 
communications; and government policies that improved transparency in remittance 
transactions.  
 
Access to services is frequently limited. Immigrants may lack the necessary 
documentation (particularly if they are in an irregular situation), they may not be 
accepted by the banking system and they may not know the local language. This leads 
to several priorities for institutional action: the need to improve access, transparency 
and competitiveness of money remitters and other financial institutions; the need to 
reduce costs; and the need for further opportunities for private business and 
partnerships.  
 
In this latter aspect, public and private banks from sending countries may establish or 
create partnerships with local institutions in host countries, close to their diasporas. 
An interesting example is the Portuguese one in the 1960s and 1970s, since 
Portuguese banks established in the most dense emigration areas and were successful 
in bringing emigrants savings back to the home country (Peixoto and Marques, 2006). 
Indeed, the conditions for trust arising from this relationship may enable a higher 
participation of migrants in the formal financial system and a larger volume of 
remittances. In the same vein, a higher co-operation of financial institutions in host 
countries with similar institutions in sending countries creates conditions for higher 
benefits for all agents involved. 
 
Several studies have been conducted about the reduction of remittances transfer costs 
and the involvement of financial institutions in the remittance market. Frequent 
recommendations are “promoting competition at the sending end of the market, 
strengthening the financial environment in remittance-receiving countries, and 
enhancing the linkages between developed countries’ financial systems and financial 
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systems in developing countries” (Page and Plaza, 2005: 302).  
 
The importance of remittances today is so high that, at the end of 2004, the World 
Bank and the Bank for International Settlements’ Committee for Payment and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS) agreed on a task force to address the need for 
international policy coordination in remittance systems. Participants in this task force 
are members of central banks from sending and receiving countries, international 
financial institutions and development banks.  
 
Due to high remittances cost or to an inadequate access to financial services, the fact 
is that informal channels continue to be largely used. The informal fund transfers 
agents include friends, family and unregistered MTOs, such as hawala dealers and 
trading companies. 
 
From the point of view of the immigrants’ home country further obstacles can be 
added. They include: the weak financial infrastructure of developing countries 
(financial agents and products); a low level of trust in formal systems; bad conditions 
provided by local agencies; and the insufficiency of economic infrastructures and 
domestic markets. 
 
The fact that the financial infrastructure of developing countries is weak makes it 
difficult to receive the money remitted easily, as well as does not allow getting more 
benefits from local agents. This is why special arrangements with postal systems, that 
handle distribution, are a good solution when the financial infrastructure and the 
financial system are not developed. The postal system usually offers the most 
extensive distribution networks in both sending and receiving countries, particularly 
in rural areas, easing the connection between the two sides. A particular problem is 
that sometimes MTOs have exclusive access to an extensive distributional network 
(such as the post offices), excluding the possibilities of competition inside of a 
corridor.  
 
On the other hand, even when a considerable number of financial agencies exist in the 
home country, often remitters and families don’t trust these agencies, because fees 
and corruption may be very high. This leaves the option of informal channels open. 
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The same results from ineffective conditions provided by local agencies, such as 
unreliability, local costs, extension of time to receive funds, etc. 
 
Finally, the fact that the economies and markets of the home countries aren’t well 
developed makes it more complicated to use formal channels. There is a need to 
provide a good financial environment, financial partnerships, a stable business and 
political environment. Furthermore, all stakeholders intervening in this process should 
have a pro-active attitude in order to change and to promote safety nets, low 




Economic migration represents, in its initial stages, a failure of development. 
Individual migrants and their families consider that the improvement of their 
standards of living cannot be done at the home country, opting for a migration 
strategy. The links between emigration and development of sending countries are 
tenuous. Despite the abundant literature produced recently about the migration-
development nexus, it is possible to argue that the positive impacts of emigration, 
migrant networks and economic transactions, including remittances, are often 
exaggerated in official documents. 
 
As the history of old emigration countries demonstrate, the dynamics of international 
migration are not linear, and the retroactive impacts of emigration, including 
remittances, are not decisive for development. The case of Portugal may be taken as 
an example of the complex processes in action (see Peixoto, 2007). On the one hand, 
the migration turnaround registered in Portugal during the 1980s, i.e., the transition 
from a net emigration to a net immigration condition, is not unambiguous. Emigration 
flows declined but increased later (although changing its character, from a permanent 
to a mostly temporary condition), whilst immigration accelerated and moved back 
very quickly. In fact, the country registered a strong upsurge in international inflows 
in the late 1990s, largely composed of immigrants coming from Eastern Europe, 
mainly Ukraine. After the early 2000s, in face of an economic downturn and the 
growth of unemployment, many of the immigrants left (by return or re-emigration to 
other countries), accompanying the resume of Portuguese outflows. 
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On the other hand, emigration and remittances were maybe important for the 
modernisation of the country, but they cannot explain the bulk of the economic 
evolution thereafter. Portugal witnessed large waves of emigration in the first decades 
of the 20th century and during the 1960s and the early 1970s. These flows were always 
paralleled by a high volume of remittances, which still maintain a large volume 
nowadays (Baganha, 1994). Despite the importance of remittances for economic 
balance – and the links of emigration with social and political modernisation –, it is 
arguable that they played a paramount role. Patterns and trends of economic growth 
depended on other factors, including the adhesion to the EU and policies enacted to 
increase education and technology. Still today the outcomes of such measures are not 
certain, since Portugal is far from closing the gap towards better-off EU countries, 
being one of the poorest among EU 15 and, in migratory terms, vacillating between 
immigration and emigration. 
  
These qualifications do not mean that emigration and remittances do not have an 
important role to play in emigrant sending countries, including many of Central and 
Eastern Europe. International migration will keep a strong pace in the European 
continent in the future, as a net receiver from other world countries and through 
internal European exchanges, either within the framework of EU or not. This is still 
more important when it is projected that, in 2050, Europe will register a pronounced 
ageing of its population, continuing to decrease its relative demographic weight in 
global terms. Therefore, sending and receiving countries are beginning to realize that 
the volume of resources currently being channelled through immigrant communities 
will continue to grow, and that public policies must be jointly developed to increase 
the development impact of remittances generated by migratory movements. 
 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe will be engaged in this process, either as 
migrant sending or receiving areas. As countries of emigration, the number of citizens 
living abroad is considerable in some cases and, correspondingly, the economic 
weight of remittances is sometimes high. Countries such as Moldova, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Albania are among the ones where emigration and remittances 
represent a higher fraction of national population and economic outcomes. Besides, 
other countries in the region, such as Poland, Romania and Ukraine, also count with 
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voluminous emigrant communities abroad, and may benefit from the transnational 
networks and economic transactions linked to their diasporas. This will continue to 
occur within the EU framework or in its external borders. 
 
The fact that emigration and remittances do not lead, per se, to development, do not 
conceal that, in an epoch of dense transnational networks and communications, the 
impacts of emigration and remittances cannot be effectively moulded by policy and 
institutional choices. The decisive role of institutions in maximizing the positive 
impacts of remittances was the point most stressed in this paper. Taken as a whole, 
remittances provoke mixed effects on development, be them positive, neutral and 
negative. Efficient institutions and sound policies may clarify these outcomes and 
maximise the positive ones. Previous knowledge of other countries experiences, the 
current transnational framework and international partnerships for development may 
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